The ARC Hemovigilance Program: advancing the safety of blood donation and transfusion by Eder, Anne F. et al.
IMMUNOHEMATOLOGY, Volume 25, Number 4, 2009 179
The ARC Hemovigilance Program: advancing 
the safety of blood donation and transfusion
A.F. Eder, B.A. Dy, J. Barton, J.M. Kennedy, and R.J. Benjamin
Since 2005, the American Red Cross (ARC) Hemovigi-lance Program has systematically evaluated adverse reactions and complications after blood donation 
and transfusion, which has led to improvements in safety 
for both donors and patients. After establishing base-
line estimates of the risk of transfusion reactions such as 
transfusion-related acute lung injury (TRALI) and sepsis 
from bacterially contaminated platelet components, the 
program has demonstrated that the preventive measures 
that were implemented to reduce their occurrence were 
effective.1–4 Reports of transfusion-transmitted infections, 
most commonly babesiosis linked to RBC components, 
have identified the need for targeted interventions.5 The 
program has also described the spectrum of adverse reac-
tions experienced by healthy volunteers after whole blood 
or apheresis donation, including systemic (e.g., vasovagal), 
phlebotomy-related, and other complications.6,7 The infor-
mation about donor reactions has led to several initiatives 
to reduce the already low rates of complications among the 
most susceptible groups and improve the donors’ experi-
ence.8,9 In this report, we present annual data on donation 
and transfusion complications in the ARC in 2007 and dis-
cuss the strengths and limitations of our national hemo- 
vigilance program.
Overview: Complications of Blood Transfusion        
 To meet safety goals (Table 1), the ARC Hemovigilance 
Program compiles and analyzes data from the 35 ARC re-
gional blood centers across the United States and Puerto 
Rico. The regional blood centers investigate complications 
of transfusion reported by the hospitals and transfusion 
services that may be related to the blood donor or to the 
manufacture of the blood components.10 Common transfu-
sion reactions, such as allergic and febrile nonhemolytic re-
actions, as well as acute or delayed hemolytic reactions, are 
not usually reported, unless the blood centers also provide 
transfusion services to hospitals or a donor- or product- 
related issue is suspected to have caused the reaction. When 
a complication of transfusion is confirmed to be fatal, the 
facility that performed the compatibility testing must re-
port the death to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA).10 In these cases, the ARC Hemovigilance Program 
also provides a voluntary, supplemental report to the FDA 
with a medical assessment of the transfusion reaction along 
with the results of our donor and manufacturing investiga-
tion. When any transfusion reaction is reported, the blood 
centers take immediate action, if needed, to gain control and 
prevent transfusion of other components from the involved 
or prior donations, to temporarily defer the individual from 
donation, and to address any suspected problems with the 
manufacturing process or procedures.
 After completing the investigation, the ARC physician 
evaluates all the information in the case and assigns a prob-
ability score on a 6-point scale, to classify the likelihood 
that the transfusion caused the reaction (Table 2). All cases 
are counted on a tally in the month that the investigation is 
closed and reported to the ARC Hemovigilance Program. 
The ARC Hemovigilance Program maintains a national 
database of investigated transfusion reactions to monitor, 
track, and analyze trends in donor and recipient complica-
tions at each region and across the system. The number of 
transfusion reactions investigated by the 35 ARC regions in 
calendar year 2007 is shown in Figure 1.
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Table 2. Probability scores for transfusion reactions
P6 – The clinical information is consistent with a transfusion reaction, 
         and a transfusion source is confirmed or highly probable (e.g., a 
         donor or component was implicated).
P5 – The clinical information is supportive of a transfusion reaction, but a 
         transfusion source is not identified.
P4 – The clinical information suggests that a transfusion reaction is  
         posible or a transfusion reaction cannot be ruled out, but the case is 
         not typical and a transfusion source is not identified.
P3 – The clinical information suggests that a transfusion reaction is 
         possible but other  etiologies are present and equally or more likely 
         the cause of the reaction.
P2 – The clinical information does not support the diagnosis of a  
         specified transfusion reaction.
P1 – There is insufficient information to investigate the case or case is 
         rescinded by the reporting institution.
Table 1. ARC Hemovigilance Program goals
To improve safety for recipients of blood components• 
To minimize procedure risk for blood donors• 
To identify sign• ificant trends that emerge from analysis of reports of 
uncommon events
To identify strategies to reduce the risk of complications in  • 
susceptible patient and donor groups
To monitor the effectiveness of the interventions introduced to • 
improve safety
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 In addition to the monthly tallies of transfusion reac-
tions, the ARC regions convey complete information to the 
ARC Hemovigilance Program on all suspected transfusion-
related fatalities and adverse reactions determined to have 
a probable or confirmed transfusion source (i.e., cases as-
signed probability codes P5 or P6). These “high-probability” 
cases are reviewed by the national medical director of the 
ARC Hemovigilance Program and further characterized. 
This evaluation affords the advantage of having one phy-
sician review all high-probability cases to confirm that ap-
propriate actions were taken and to achieve consistency in 
coding cases across the system. Moreover, the ARC Hemov-
igilance Program has developed more-specific case 
definitions for certain transfusion complications (e.g., 
Babesia infection) in an effort to more accurately describe 
the current transfusion risk, as described in greater detail 
in the following sections. The number of high-probability 
transfusion reactions reviewed by the ARC Hemovigilance 
Program in 2007 are shown in Figure 2. Focusing on the 
transfusion reactions most consistently reported to our 
blood centers, the ARC Hemovigilance Program has con-
ducted in-depth analysis that has advanced transfusion 
safety for patients and identified the need for further inter-
ventions to improve clinical outcomes of transfusion.
Transfusion-Related Acute Lung Injury
 Transfusion-related acute lung injury (TRALI) emerged 
as a leading cause of morbidity and mortality associated 
with blood component therapy, accounting for most of the 
deaths reported to the FDA since 2004.11 The United King-
dom was the first to introduce precautionary measures, in 
2003, to reduce TRALI by the preferential use of plasma 
from male donors. In the ensuing 5 years, their Serious 
Hazards of Transfusion program (SHOT) registered fewer 
TRALI cases and no fatalities associated with plasma trans-
fusion.12 Although 2008 saw three cases of TRALI that im-
plicated a female donor of fresh-frozen plasma, SHOT 
reported no TRALI cases in 2005, 2006, or 2007.12
 Similar to the United Kingdom’s experience, the ARC 
Hemovigilance Program found that plasma components 
were responsible for the majority (63%) of probable TRALI 
fatalities and that a female antibody-positive donor was 
identified in 75 percent of these cases.3 The number of re-
ported TRALI cases increased each year between 2003 and 
2006. In late 2006, the ARC began shifting plasma com-
ponents collected from female donors to further pharma-
ceutical manufacturing so that the plasma distributed for 
transfusion to patients was collected predominantly from 
male donors. The proportion of plasma components col-
lected from male donors progressively increased from 55 
percent in 2006, to 78 percent in 2007, and to more than 
95 percent in 2008. Concurrently, the number of probable 
TRALI cases among reported fatalities that involved only 
plasma transfusion was significantly decreased in 2008 (0 
cases) compared with 2006 (6 cases) or 2007 (5 cases; p 
< 0.05).4 Moreover, probable TRALI was more likely to be 
associated with plasma than RBC transfusion in 2006 and 
2007, but not in 2008.4
 Both the ARC Hemovigilance Program and the United 
Kingdom’s SHOT organization acknowledge the limitations 
inherent to passive surveillance and retrospective review, 
including incomplete hospital and regional blood center 
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Fig. 2. The number of cases with complications after transfusions in 
2007 reviewed by the ARC Hemovigilance Program is shown for all 
complication types, except hepatitis C (HCV). The number of cases 
open in 2007 is shown for HCV, with the year of transfusion in each 
case indicated on the graph. ALL = allergic; BAB = babesiosis; 
HBV = hepatitis B; HEM = hemolytic; ORX = other transfusion 
reaction; SEP = septic; TRL = transfusion-related acute lung injury. 
P5-P6, see probability scores, Table 2.
Fig. 1. The number of cases with complications after transfusions 
reported to the ARC Hemovigilance Program in 2007 is shown for 
all complication types. ALL = allergic; BAB = babesiosis; HBV = 
hepatitis B; HCV = hepatitis C; HEM = hemolytic; ORX = other 
transfusion reaction; OTI = other infection; SEP = septic; TRL = 
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participation, and potential investigational, reporting, and 
analytical bias. Regardless, the encouraging reports from 
SHOT and the corroborative data from the ARC Hemo- 
vigilance Program suggest that limiting transfusion of leu-
kocyte antibody–containing plasma components reduces 
the morbidity and mortality associated with TRALI.
 In formulating a rational, and incremental, approach to 
TRALI prevention in the United States, blood centers are 
currently planning measures to reduce the risk of TRALI 
associated with apheresis platelet transfusion, while bal-
ancing the effect of any measures on availability of compo-
nents for transfusions. Data on the effectiveness of these 
precautionary measures are not yet available but are being 
collected by the ARC Hemovigilance Program and other 
centers as the measures are introduced.
Septic Transfusion Reactions    
 In response to a new AABB Standard in 2004, most 
blood centers introduced methods to limit and detect bac-
teria in platelet components, which decreased but did 
not eliminate the risk of sepsis after apheresis platelet 
transfusion (Fig. 3).1,2,13 The ARC Hemovigilance Program 
subsequently demonstrated incremental improvements in 
limiting contamination and increasing the sensitivity of 
bacterial testing to further reduce the risk of septic reac-
tions to platelet transfusion. First, an association was ob-
served between a method to collect apheresis platelets and 
subsequent transfusion-related sepsis. The increased risk 
with apheresis platelet donations from two-arm (double-
needle) procedures compared with one-arm (single-needle) 
procedures was both clinically apparent as reported sep-
tic transfusion reactions and detected by routine quality- 
control bacterial culture of apheresis platelet donations.1 
The data implicated skin bacteria in the vast majority of 
clinical reactions and all reported fatalities. The most no-
table difference between the two procedure types was that 
two-arm collection sets did not discard or divert the initial 
10 to 20 mL of blood collected from the draw line into a 
separate container or tubes during two-arm procedures, 
unlike the one-arm procedures. The lack of this feature on 
the collection set, commonly referred to as sample diver-
sion, may have contributed to the higher amount of skin 
flora contamination of platelet components collected with 
the two-arm procedures.
 To address this possibility, the ARC converted all 
apheresis collection procedures to use inlet-line sample di-
version in 2006. Concomitantly, the sample volume taken 
for quality-control bacterial culture was increased from 
4 mL to 8 mL from each apheresis platelet donation.2 This 
change to double the sample volume was predicted to in-
crease culture sensitivity by about 25 percent.13 The ARC 
Hemovigilance Program reported the outcome after intro-
ducing the two operational changes and demonstrated that 
each measure contributed to a substantial improvement in 
safety for apheresis platelet transfusion.2 First, inlet-line 
diversion decreased bacterial contamination during two-
arm collections by more than 46 percent. Second, doubling 
the sample volume was associated with a 54 percent relative 
increase in culture sensitivity, which corresponded to the 
predicted absolute increase of 25 percent.2,14 Similar benefit 
of initial sample diversion was observed for whole-blood–
derived platelet pools when bacterial culture was intro-
duced.15 Ongoing surveillance by the ARC Hemovigilance 
Program and operational trials will continue to focus on the 
residual risk of septic reactions to platelet transfusion, to 
identify additional opportunities for improvement.
Infectious Complications of Transfusion    
 The ARC Hemovigilance Program also monitors all 
suspected transfusion-related infections reported to the 35 
ARC blood centers that are investigated by regional physi-
cians. Not surprisingly, transfusion-transmitted infectious 
diseases for which the blood supply is screened are rarely 
identified through passive surveillance even though 
hundreds of cases of suspected transfusion-transmitted 
infections are considered each year. Since the introduc-
tion of infectious disease testing more than 20 years ago 
and nucleic acid amplification testing (NAT) in 1999, the 
risk of infection with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
or hepatitis C virus (HCV) through a blood transfusion has 
been reduced to an estimated 1 in 2 million.16 FDA-man-
dated “lookback” procedures, which are initiated after a 
returning donor has a confirmed-positive HIV test result, 
Fig. 3. The rate of septic transfusion reactions (per million aphere-
sis platelet components created) before and after introducing 
routine quality control bacterial culture in Period 1 (39 percent of 
collection procedures with sample diversion; 4-mL sample volume 
cultured) and Period 2 (100 percent collection procedures with 
sample diversion, 8-mL sample volume cultured).1,2,13 Reported 
fatalities are shown in red. The rate of septic reactions significantly 
decreased with time (Before Culture vs. Period 2, odds ratio, 0.33; 
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as mild symptoms (e.g., lightheadedness, dizziness) that 
resolve promptly but are still unpleasant for the donor.6,7 
Serious injury is rare, but typically follows from a loss of 
consciousness, either at the donation site or after leaving 
the premises, or from nerve injury after the phlebotomy.6
 All adverse reactions occurring at ARC collection sites 
are managed by collection staff and documented on the 
blood donation record according to the standard proce-
dures. All donors are also instructed to contact the donor 
center if they experience problems or have concerns about 
their health after donation. Donor complications are classi-
fied according to the reaction type (systemic, phlebotomy-
related, other) and severity of the symptoms (minor, major; 
Table 4). The reactions coded on the blood donation record 
by collections staff are captured in a centralized database; 
reactions that are called back to donor centers and cases 
that received outside medical care are captured in a sepa-
rate database. The ARC Hemovigilance Program compiles 
and analyzes data on complications after whole blood do-
nation that occurred at the collection site or that were re-
ported to the blood center after the donor left the site and 
on all cases involving donors who were referred for outside 
medical care by staff or later reported that they sought or 
received care from another health-care provider (Table 5). 
Most syncopal-type reactions occurred at the collection site, 
but many cases involving loss of consciousness (LOC), pro-
longed recovery, or syncope-related injury were recognized 
or classified after the donation. About 15 percent of synco-
pal reactions result in injury (e.g., head trauma, lacerations, 
contusions), with about a third of these incidents requiring 
outside medical care (0.57 per 10,000 donations). Phleboto-
my-related adverse events (e.g., large hematoma, suspected 
nerve irritation) more often become apparent after the do-
nor leaves the collection site. Taking these reactions into 
account, the rate of suspected nerve irritation was 3.2 cases 
per 10,000 donations; only 13 percent of donors with pos-
sible nerve irritation reported receiving outside medical care 
(0.43 per 10,000 donations). The ARC Hemovigilance Pro-
gram has evaluated the risks to certain groups of donors who 
are more susceptible to reactions after donation (e.g., young, 
first-time, female donors).8 Future study will analyze the risk 
factors associated with delayed reactions and cases of out-
have identified only four reported breakthrough HIV cases 
from three implicated donations (nonreactive by minipool 
NAT) since 1999 in the United States.16,17 HCV lookback is 
also required by the FDA; similarly, recipient-tracing is of-
ten performed for HBV and other infections, even though 
not required by FDA, when a donor is subsequently found 
to have confirmed positive test results. In addition, patients 
suspected of contracting infection through transfusion are 
reported and investigated by blood centers in an effort to 
determine whether any of the involved donations, which 
tested negative for all markers at the time of donation, were 
from donors who subsequently had positive test results. The 
ARC Hemovigilance Program has identified cases of trans-
fusion-transmitted HCV and HIV; however, all transfusions 
occurred before 1999, and the implicated donors had pre-
viously triggered lookback, although the notification at the 
time had not identified the infected recipient. As expected, 
the rarity of definite cases of transfusion-transmitted infec-
tions identified through passive surveillance supports the 
known low risk of infection with viruses for which the blood 
supply is screened.
 More importantly, the ARC Hemovigilance Program 
has delineated the risk of infections for which blood donors 
are not tested.5 Babesia microti accounts for most of the 
infections investigated by the ARC, with five to ten definite 
or probable cases of transfusion transmission each year. 
Because of the difficulty in assessing whether infection was 
acquired through a blood transfusion or other means (e.g., 
tick exposure) in endemic areas, more specific definitions 
than the standard six-point imputability scale were devel-
oped by the ARC Hemovigilance Program to further define 
the likelihood of a transfusion source of infection (Table 
3). The value in having detailed information on suspected 
cases is that it allows further characterization, which is not 
possible in other hemovigilance systems that do not capture 
primary data about the event. Although passive surveillance 
will not identify all cases, the scope of the problem defined 
by the ARC Hemovigilance Program supports the need for 
targeted interventions to reduce the risk of transfusion-
transmitted Babesia infection.18
Donation-Related Complications
 Although public attention, government regulation, and 
the industry effort are traditionally focused on patient safe-
ty, blood centers also have an obligation to make blood do-
nation as safe as possible for healthy volunteers. Each year, 
the ARC evaluates about 7.8 million individuals who pres-
ent to donate whole blood or apheresis components and 
provides about 40 percent of the blood for transfusion in 
the United States. The blood supply depends entirely on the 
daily commitment of volunteers, who gain only intangible 
personal benefit from blood donation but are exposed to 
potential risk of discomfort or, in rare cases, injury result-
ing from the collection procedure. About 2 to 12 percent of 
all presenting donors experience an adverse reaction that 
is documented at the collection site, most being classified 
Table 3. Transfusion-transmitted Babesia classification
Cases in which the patient had a proven B. microti infection after transfu-
sion that was not related to known prior infection were classified as
“defin• ite” if the patient was not a resident in a Babesia-endemic 
state (CT, NJ, NY, MN, WI), had no known risk factors for Babesia 
infection, was diagnosed with clinical disease within 3 months of 
transfusion, and a donor was identified and tested positive for Babe-
sia antibodies or had evidence of recent infection;
“probable” if the patient was a resident in a • Babesia-endemic state 
(CT, NJ, NY, MN, WI) or had another risk factor for Babesia infection 
and a donor tested positive for Babesia antibodies or had evidence 
of recent infection; or
“possible” if the donor was not tested but was a resident of an • 
endemic area or had a recent travel history to an endemic area.
A.F. Eder et al.
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Table 4. Definitions of donor complications in the ARC
Systemic (syncopal-type):
Minor category Major category
Presyncopal (prefaint)
Pallor, weakness, light-headedness, 
dizziness, diaphoresis, nausea/vom-
iting, no loss of consciousness
Loss of consciousness (LOC), 
short:
lasting less than 1 minute
LOC, long:
lasting 1 minute or more or compli-
cated by seizures or convulsions or 
loss of bladder or bowel control
Prolonged recovery:
Presyncopal symptoms, loss of 
consciousness or other reaction 
that does not resolve within ap-
proximately 30 minutes
Injury
associated with symptoms of 
prefaint or LOC (e.g., head injury, 
fractures, abrasions, lacerations)
Phlebotomy-related:
Minor category Major category
Hematoma, small:
Involved area measures 2 × 2 
inches or less
Hematoma, large:
Involved area measures more than 
2 × 2 inches
Suspected nerve irritation:
Suggested by pain, tingling, numb-
ness, or sharp shooting pains after 
phlebotomy
Suspected arterial puncture:
Suggested by rapid (< 3 min) 
bleed time, pulsatile flow, or bright 
red blood
Other Reaction Types
Minor category Major category
Citrate reactions*:
Perioral or peripheral tingling or 
numbness that does not resolve 
with reduced flow rate or oral cal-
cium supplementation (e.g., Tums) 
or when accompanied by additional 
symptoms such as nausea, muscle 
tightness, or cramping; other 
symptoms
Citrate reactions*:
Symptoms of minor citrate plus 
prolonged or exaggerated muscle 
spasm (tetany), vomiting, chest 
tightness
Allergic reaction, localized:
Itching, rash, or redness of skin; 
hives
Allergic reaction, systemic:
Symptoms of minor allergic reac-
tions, plus swelling of the face, 
neck, or throat, wheezing, or respi-
ratory difficulty
Other reaction:
Symptom profile different from es-
tablished categories (e.g., anxious-
ness, hyperventilation, headache)
Other reaction:
Symptom profile different from 
established categories (e.g., chest 
pain, thrombophlebitis)
*Automated procedures only.
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123 0.10 (166) (0.14) 19 0.02




10 0.01 17 0.01 11 0.01
Other 252 0.21 1,208 1.00 352 0.29
Subtotal‡ 843 0.70 2,544 2.11 523 0.43
Total (all 
categories)
469,951 391 25,561 21.2 3,727 3.10
* This column includes all major events documented at the collection 
site and reactions reported after donation, which are reviewed by an 
ARC physician. The subset of minor reactions reviewed by an ARC phy-
sician, typically identified through callbacks, are included in parentheses.
† Rate per 10,000 donations (successful and unsuccessful [QNS] col-
lections).
‡ Subtotals are of minor and major categories.
LOC = loss of consciousness.
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side medical care to identify or refine preventive strategies 
for these more medically severe reactions or other symptoms 
after donation that lead to additional medical attention.
Conclusions
 The ARC Hemovigilance Program is one aspect of a 
continuous improvement effort at the ARC to advance the 
safety of blood donation and transfusion. Data from the 
program have informed policy and have prompted changes 
in procedures to reduce the risk to both transfused patients 
and blood donors. The program’s strength lies in its abil-
ity to analyze uncommon or rare events and to recognize 
trends that may be associated with certain donor selection 
or blood component manufacturing practices. Another ad-
vantage offered by a blood center–driven hemovigilance 
program is the ability to capture detailed information about 
each reported transfusion event and every donation-related 
complication, rather than summary information derived 
from the final assignment of reaction codes or aggregate 
data to estimate denominators. Challenges that the pro-
gram faces are the inherent limitation of passive surveil-
lance and the likelihood that hospitals do not report all 
transfusion reactions to the blood center. Regardless, the 
sample size is adequate to estimate the scope of TRALI, 
septic transfusion reactions, and transfusion-transmitted 
babesiosis. Finally, blood centers are typically focused on 
issues related to blood component manufacturing and do-
nor selection; consequently, their hemovigilance programs 
are not designed to capture common, idiosyncratic transfu-
sion reactions (e.g., allergic) or problems associated with 
medical errors or near misses, such as ABO incompatible 
transfusion, overtransfusion, or inappropriate transfu-
sion practice. In this regard, the US Biovigilance Network, 
a unique public-private collaboration between the federal 
government (e.g., CDC, FDA) and organizations involved in 
blood collection, transfusion, and tissue and organ trans-
plantation (e.g., AABB) promises to address this need in a 
national hemovigilance program for the United States.19 In 
conclusion, blood centers have a dual responsibility to pro-
vide an adequate supply of blood components to the com-
munity and to protect the safety of volunteer donors. We 
have made our data available to highlight our continued 
focus on improving donor and patient safety.
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